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SOURCE Neue Zuercher Zeitung.MOSCOW INCREASES PRESSURE ON POLAND

The pressure which Moscow exerts on Poland is becoming heavier all the time. The masters of the Kremlin are pursuing three goals, each of which they consider essential. Two of them have long been known. First, there is the question of firmly ensconcing Communism in Poland. The administrative authorities pursue this goal with the greatest tenacity. In Poland, there are 19 schools which each year train 8,000 specialists. They have the task of teaching the members of the Communist Party's sections the real techniques of Communism. About 100,000 additional members of the party are then made familiar with these techniques in courses which last 3 to 6 months. Participation in courses on Leninism and Stalinism is mandatory for all officials and employees of the state. Enrollment at universities is limited to persons who have distinguished themselves in the service of Communism.

Moscow's second goal is the Russification of Poland. Poland's schools devote as much time to the study of the Russian language as to the Polish. It is openly admitted that the main task of the youth organizations is the development of devotion and loyalty to the Soviet Union. In 1950, the authorities printed 116 million copies of Stalin's Works and translations of various Soviet authors; this number is to be increased to 122 million, i.e., six books per inhabitant, by the end of 1951. In addition, during the last 3 months 2 million Russian-language books have been imported from the USSR. Because of the pressure exerted on the population, the number of Poles who subscribe to Soviet newspapers has increased from 220,000 in 1950 to 800,000 this year. Moreover, the Warsaw government, on orders from the Kremlin, has distributed more than 200,000 youth periodicals at its own expense.

The education to Communism and the efforts towards Russification do not come as a surprise. It is different with the third goal of the Russian policy in Poland. This third goal falls within the framework of a large-scale program which also embraces Czechoslovakia and East Germany. According to reports from reliable sources, Moscow has decided to merge the three Satellites, gradually, into a joint organization. Officially, of course, this is not admitted,

- 1 -

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but indications of such plans can be found in the economic, political, and military spheres. It is known that the Czechs and the Poles, despite all their resistance, have been forced into very close economic cooperation with the German Democratic Republic. The two Slavic countries believe that the USSR, which is eager to win the good will of the East Germans, will see to it that the latter will reap the main benefit from such an arrangement.

Public life in the Satellites takes place exclusively within the compass of the Communist parties. The unification of these parties therefore, would make the realization of Moscow's plans much easier. For some time now, the future cadres of the Communist parties of Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia have been instructed and trained together under Soviet guidance. The number of East Germans who work as propagandists of the Moscow party in Poland is growing steadily. This policy, of course, can only be traced to the Kremlin. The same phenomenon has also been noted in Prague.

The Poles are watching very closely for indications of a change in Moscow's position on the matter of Germany's eastern border. Formerly the Kremlin took every opportunity to assure Poland that a modification of this border would never be considered. These assurances are no longer voiced. For example, last July, Molotov made a speech in Warsaw in which he avoided any mention of the Oder-Neisse line; this made an extremely painful impression on his Polish listeners. Very disquieting to Polish circles was a statement by Gen Vincenz Mueller, one of Moscow's confidential aides setting up the Sovzone People's Police. During a recent trip to West Germany he told refugees from the former German east provinces which have been annexed to Poland that the time for their return home is approaching, because it is almost certain that a German-Polish condominium will be set up in these regions. Under the circumstances, it is assumed that this statement was made with Moscow's approval.

These new tendencies of Soviet policy are disturbing even to certain leading circles of the Polish regime. Moscow, wanting to avoid unnecessary difficulties, is proceeding slowly toward its goal. But it insists, with ever-increasing emphasis, that all so-called nationalistic elements be excluded from the Communist Party and be rendered harmless. This, of course, applies especially to the entire military sphere. Trials and purges in the Polish Army continue unabated. They serve not only to strengthen the reliability of the army in the interests of Moscow, but also to prepare it for the closest co-operation or, perhaps, even for the complete unification with the troops of East Germany and Czechoslovakia. According to reports from usually reliable sources, Marshal Zhukov is being considered as future commander in chief of such a united army. It is assumed that in this respect, too, Moscow is being guided by its policy in regard to Germany, because Moscow seems to believe that German military men would respect Zhukov and would subordinate themselves to him more readily than to any other Communist general.

In certain diplomatic circles in Warsaw the tactics calculated to produce an assimilation of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany are explained as the intention of the USSR to oppose the West European army with an East European army. For this, Moscow would have to be sure of the collaboration of the Germans; but this could be had only at the price of a revision of Germany's eastern border. However, a restoration of the prewar border would be detrimental to Soviet prestige and popularity in the East Bloc states. Hence, the desire to bring the three countries into a relationship with each other which would rob the border question of its importance or at least eliminate it from official discussion.

The Poles are, so to speak, between hammer and anvil. On the one hand, Moscow exerts efforts for the reunification of Germany in the hope of playing the dominant role in this German state, on the other hand, Moscow desires as

- 2 -

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close an interrelationship as possible between Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. These two goals seem incompatible. But for that very reason they represent a typical example of the twofold policy which the Kremlin is in the habit of carrying on. If, as is to be expected, the policy does not achieve the first goal, it could still realize the second, since success depends mainly upon it. Each of the two possibilities goes counter to Poland's interests. Poland fears a strong Germany, but fears even more the other Soviet alternative.

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- 3 -

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